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Embedded Property
Douglas C. Harris

Introduction: private property, common property,
and condominium1
The institution of property arises in the tension between autonomy and
community. It serves not simply to demarcate spaces of individual control and
authority, but also to balance individual with collective interests. This balance
swings, the weight shifting towards individual or collective, and the
movement is perhaps most apparent across the space between private
property and common property. To hold private property is to be recognized
as the owner and to enjoy the benefits of ownership, including a considerable
degree of control over the use of the owned resource. The emphasis, as
William Blackstone’s famous ‘sole and despotic dominion’ characterization
announces, is on the owner, ‘in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe’.2 On the other hand, common property establishes
rights for members of a group to use and access resources, subject to
collectively prescribed rules. Here the focus tends towards the decisionmaking of the group, not the individual, and, following Elinor Ostrom’s
influential work, to the institutions of collective action.3
Private property and common property emphasize individual and
collective interests respectively, but the bifurcation may not be as stark as it
appears. Common property suggests the prominence of collective control, but
it also creates, in CB MacPherson’s helpful formulation, an individual right not
to be excluded,4 and in democratically governed communities, an individual
right to participate in governing the uses of common-pool resources. As a
result, common property can serve an important role in protecting and
securing individual interests, even if it is the collective, rather than the
individual, with decision-making authority. Conversely, understandings of
private property have tended to emphasize variations of an owner’s right to
exclude, but not untrammelled decision-making authority or even the
absence of community. Indeed, many, including Blackstone, recognize ‘sole
and despotic dominion’ as a caricature of the institution of private property,
which is never absolute or entirely separate from, but instead always
dependent on and supporting community.5
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Condominium, as an architecture of land ownership, engages directly
with the tension between autonomy and community by creating and
combining private property and common property interests, and then by
allocating democratic rights to the owners of these interests to participate in
governing their uses. It is one among a number of legal forms, including
cooperative and homeowners association, that are deployed in multi-unit
developments to create spheres of individual control and responsibility within
a self-governing community. 6 It is the legal separateness of the individual
units that distinguishes condominium from cooperative, and the coownership interests in common property that marks condominium as
different from the homeowners association. Cornelius van der Merwe
describes condominium as embodying a dualistic approach to ownership in
multi-unit developments to signal that each owner holds two distinct property
interests: a separate title to a particular unit and a co-ownership interest in
the common property, held in common with the other title holders.7
Condominium constructs separate titles to individual units, and these
private interests are carefully mapped in a constituting plan that marks their
boundaries. However, notwithstanding their legal separateness, the private
interests are inseparable from the common property interests; their
ownership cannot be severed from the accompanying rights to undivided
shares of the common property. Moreover, this packaging of private with
common property reflects a physical entwining: the individual units rely on
the common property, which exists to support, to shelter, to secure access to,
and as an amenity for, the privately held units. Indeed, the private property
within condominium cannot exist without the common property, which exists
in service of the private. The corollary of this entitlement is an obligation on
the unit owners to share the costs of maintaining and, when necessary,
replacing the common property. The owners of individual units, as co-owners
of the common property, must contribute, in proportion to their shares, to its
upkeep.
Democratic rights, usually conveyed in the form of shares in a
condominium corporation, are the third element of ownership within
condominium. Each unit is typically allotted one vote, but other arrangements
are possible, including voting rights based on relative floor areas of individual
units or the proportions of common property ownership.8 These voting rights,
which confer the opportunity to participate in the governance of the private
and common property, are an integral part of ownership within
condominium, but the binding that holds them to the property interests can
be loosened in certain, albeit rare circumstances, to permit a tenant or a
creditor to assume an owner’s voting rights. Apart from these few instances
where voting rights may be detached temporarily, and usually only partially,
from the status of owner, the right to participate in a democracy of owners is
part of the condominium package.
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What I have described in the preceding paragraphs is an architecture
of ownership that constructs a form of embedded property. Condominium
binds private property with common property and democratic rights to lodge
the private interests within a community of owners. The private interests are
constructed by, and only exist within, condominium. One might point out, as
many have, that private property is always embedded within community, that
even outside condominium ‘property is a sociable institution, depending on
the recognition and respect of others’, 9 or that ‘property is not just an
individual entitlement but a social institution involving many owners’. 10
However, condominium not only constructs private interests, but also the
immediate community in which they are embedded. Moreover, it is
impossible to disembed those private interests; the private property of
condominium only exists within condominium.
In this chapter, I offer the concept of embedded property as a way of
thinking about and understanding condominium property, and of explaining
how ownership of land within condominium is changing the character of
ownership. I do so in the next section by describing property within
condominium as spatially embedded, politically embedded, and temporally
embedded, and then by demonstrating how these different, albeit
overlapping, modes by which condominium embeds property are forcing
courts and legislatures to reconsider long-accepted and well-understood
incidents or attributes of land ownership. In identifying the spatial embedding
of condominium property and its impact on understandings of ownership, I
review the judicial responses in the Canadian provinces of Ontario and British
Columbia to the chronic anti-social behaviour of individual owners. To
consider the political embedding, I turn to the legislative framework and
judicial decisions from several Australian states and Canadian provinces
involving disputes over the capacity of condominium corporations to restrict
rentals, particularly short-term rentals. Finally, I describe and consider the
temporal embedding of condominium property through a discussion of the
shift in many statutory condominium jurisdictions away from a presumption
that the dissolution of condominium requires the unanimous consent of
owners, to a presumption that dissolution, and thus the termination of private
property interests within condominium, may proceed on the basis of a
supermajority vote.
The analysis reveals that the spatial, political, and temporal
embedding of property is straining accepted understandings of land
ownership, and judges and legislators are responding to this pressure by
changing the character of ownership in land. Moreover, these changes are not
simply modifications of doctrine and should not be discounted merely as
technical changes; instead, they should also be understood as precipitating
significant changes in the role and function of property. As Cathy Sherry has
argued regarding Australian condominium legislation and case law, ‘we must
be conscious of the ways in which we are straying from orthodox rules of
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property and the consequences of that divergence.’ 11 In the concluding
section, I suggest that the surge towards condominium as the preferred
architecture of ownership in many jurisdictions around the world over the
past 50 years is precipitating a transformation in the institution of property in
land, and, not only for land within condominium. I also raise the paradox of
condominium—that the embedding of property within condominium is also
creating the capacity for communities of owners to disembed themselves
from the larger public realm.
Embedded Property
As an architecture of ownership that binds private property with common
property and democratic rights to participate in a governing body,
condominium produces property interests that are embedded within a
community of owners. This embedding occurs in the creation of a
condominium development, fixing the private interests within the legal form,
but the embedding is also a process that continues to shape the nature and
character of property and of ownership. The form of that embedding may
usefully be described as occurring in spatial, political, and temporal modes.
Within condominium, property is spatially, politically, and temporally
embedded, and each mode of embedding is acting on the institution of
ownership.
Spatially embedded
“Blackacre” has long served common law lawyers, judges, and scholars as the
imagined parcel of land in innumerable property law hypotheticals. 12 The
image that it conveys, or at least that I have always imagined, of a fenced rural
acre, emphasizes the separateness and apartness of the land and its owner.
Indeed, understandings of ownership built around Blackacre as the
hypothetical object of property tend to identify a singular owner, “A”, and to
prioritize variations of the right to exclude as the irreducible core of
property.13 Amnon Lehavi has pointed to the limitations of what he describes
as the “Blackacre Paradigm,” arguing that it suggests a detachment of
property from community, a singularity of ownership, and a purity of private
property that belie contemporary patterns of ownership.14 Lehavi and others
have turned to common interest communities, with their packaging of private
property, common property, and democratic rights as a principal exhibit in
their efforts to shift some of the emphasis in definitions of property away
from the individual and the right to exclude.15
However, Blackacre does more symbolic work that has yet to be
noticed: it conjures an image of owners spread in a single layer or stratum
over the surface of the earth, separated by a fence or some other boundary
marker which can be represented on a two-dimensional map. Blackacre
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suggests the possibility of a neighbouring Whiteacre or Greenacre on the
other side of a fence. It is much harder to imagine a neighbouring, colouredacre that occupies territory above or below Blackacre. Subsurface and
airspace rights are possible, of course, but they usually appear as tangential
to, or derivative of, the surface interest in Blackacre. As a result, this
hypothetical object of ownership constructs a particular spatial arrangement
of landowners, and this arrangement produces the imagined space in which
the law of property and the institution of ownership have developed.
Blackacre does not work as the hypothetical parcel of land within
condominium. To begin with, condominium requires a built structure, not
open fields; the subdivision of land into smaller parcels within condominium
is only permitted once the spatial boundaries of those parcels have been
defined by the floors, walls, and ceilings of a building. 16 In addition,
condominium transforms the spatial context of property by facilitating an
extraordinary increase in the density of parcels and thus, of owners. This is
most apparent in the condominium apartment tower. Where there was once
a single parcel of land marked over a section of the surface of the earth, within
condominium there may now be tens or even hundreds of parcels, stacked in
a vertical column and sharing not only a fence line but also floors, walls, and
ceilings, and much other infrastructure besides. The stacking of parcels
enables the stacking of owners. Indeed, condominium facilitates a spatial
reconfiguration of property interests and their owners, creating a previously
unimaginable density and proximity, and this spatial embedding produces a
dramatically different context in which the institution of ownership must
operate. Not surprisingly, courts and legislatures have responded to the
spatial embedding of property by revisiting and reshaping what it means to
be an owner of an interest in land. This is evident in the judicial treatment of
chronic anti-social behaviour within condominium.
Chronic anti-social behaviour
Proximity creates challenge. In 2010, a court in the Canadian province of
Ontario evicted an owner from her condominium unit and ordered that she
sell it within three months because of her chronic anti-social behaviour.17 The
behaviour included
physical assaults on other unit holders, acts of mischief against their
property, racist and homophobic slurs and threats repeatedly made
against other unit holders, playing extremely loud music at night,
watching and besetting other unit holders and using her large and
aggressive dog to frighten and intimidate other unit holders and their
children.18
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The court concluded that the only viable remedy for the other 33 unit owners
within the townhouse condominium complex was to expel the offending
owner, and it found the authority to make such an order in the province’s
condominium legislation.19
Several years later, the courts in British Columbia arrived at a similar
conclusion in a case involving a volatile relationship between a mother and
adult son, and the impact of their behaviour on the other residents in a 132unit condominium complex in the City of Surrey, a suburb of Vancouver.20 In
addition to frequent and loud altercations between mother and son, the adult
son had abused and harassed other residents with foul language, obscene
gestures, and intimidating behaviour. The behaviour had continued over four
years, notwithstanding frequent warnings from the strata corporation, fines
amounting to more than $20,000, and court orders to cease. Eventually, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal confirmed a lower court’s eviction and sale
order, but indicated that the province’s condominium legislation only
permitted such an order where an owner was in contempt of a prior court
order to comply with the legislation or condominium bylaws.21
When I first wrote about these decisions in 2016, I counted ten
reported decisions, including the two discussed above, in which Ontario and
British Columbia courts had granted eviction and sale orders against owners
within condominium for chronic anti-social behaviour.22 Since then, there are
two more reported decisions, one from each jurisdiction, in which the courts
have concluded that an eviction and sale order is an appropriate remedy for
those owners seeking relief from another owner’s chronic anti-social
behaviour. 23 Perhaps in recognition of the severity of such an order, the
British Columbia Supreme Court in its most recent decision indicated that
owners seeking an eviction and sale order against another owner must
establish ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’—the standard of proof in criminal
law—that the offending owner was in contempt of a prior court order. 24
In addition to these judicial decisions, the relatively recent overhaul of
Ontario’s Condominium Act included statutory direction about the
appropriate use of permanent eviction orders.25 Courts must only make such
an order where a person’s conduct ‘poses a serious risk’ to health and safety
or damage to property.26 Moreover, the conduct must demonstrate that ‘the
person is unsuited for the communal occupation of the property or the
communal use of the property’ and ‘no other order will be adequate’.27 The
amendment makes no mention of sale orders and, although passed in 2015,
has yet to be proclaimed into force.
By removing the immunity of an owner from eviction and forced sale
for chronic anti-social behaviour, the courts have diverged from long-held and
well-established conceptions within the common law of what it means to be
an owner of an interest in land. Title holders outside condominium might face
criminal penalty or civil sanction, such as liability in nuisance, for chronic antisocial behaviour, but not an eviction and sale order. The spatial dispersion of
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property interests within the Blackacre paradigm serves to insulate owners
from the behaviour of neighbours, and this has shaped a construction of
ownership which does not include minimum standards of personal behaviour
to maintain the status of owner. That this is no longer the case, at least in
Ontario and British Columbia, is a fundamental change in the nature and
quality of ownership. Ownership now includes access to a new remedy—an
order to expel a neighbour from condominium for chronic anti-social
behaviour. Ownership has also become more precarious, at least for some,
because contingent on a minimum standard of personal behaviour. 28 This
change in what it means to be an owner is, at least in part, a judicial response
to the particular spatial embedding of property within condominium.
Politically embedded
One of the prominent figures in the body of thought that came to be known
as liberalism, John Locke created a powerful illusion that private property
might be acquired simply through the actions of individuals.29 In his parable
of the origins of private property, humans owned their bodies and thus the
labour of their bodies, God had given the world to humankind in common,
and an individual might, by mixing their labour with the things of the world,
claim a property interest in those things. There were limitations to this labour
theory of property, but the effect was that property interests might be
understood as arising prior to society, and by extension, that the primary role
of society, and ultimately of the state, was to protect those prior interests.
Although powerfully resonant in western societies and serving as an
intellectual foundation for a ‘bottom-up’ origin story of property rights,30 the
assertion within Locke’s labour theory of property for a pre-social acquisition
of property was only ever an illusion. Most minimally, the claim to property,
and thus to an enforceable right, requires a community that is prepared to
recognize and acknowledge—to be persuaded of, in Carol Rose’s
formulation—something more than mere possession.31 Jeremy Waldron goes
further, arguing the individualist account of property fails to recognize that
the private rights of property rely and depend upon on the public realm, such
that the institution of property is ‘an artifact of the interaction of public law
and private law’.32 The private entitlements of property are never solely the
product of private actions but always involve the public realm, something that
Joseph Singer captures in his description of property as ‘a social and political
institution and not merely an individual entitlement’.33
This characterization of property as the product of private and public
realms speaks directly to condominium property. Indeed, whatever the
strength of the Lockean illusion in providing a justification for private
property, any pretence of private property as something that is separate from,
or prior to, society is impossible to sustain within condominium.
Condominium produces property interests and it embeds those interests
7

within a community of owners with the power to govern the uses of that
property. 34 This political embedding is a function of ownership; residency
within the community is largely immaterial. Tenants do not enjoy the right to
participate; the democratic rights within condominium derive from
ownership. Moreover, in many jurisdictions, the possibility of tenants, and
thus of an owner’s right to rent or lease their property, depends on the
community of owners. Where the statutory framework permits, the
community of owners may decide to restrict or even to prohibit rentals,
thereby curtailing one of the means by which to alienate interests in land and
limiting what has generally been understood as a fundamental incident of
land ownership.
Short-term accommodation
Short-term rentals prohibited. This was the decision of the owners in a 351unit mixed residential and retail condominium development—the Watergate
Apartments—in the Australian city of Melbourne when, at the first meeting
of the owners corporation in 2004, they voted for a rule banning the rental of
units for less than one month.35 Notwithstanding the prohibition, one owner
acquired 14 apartments within the development and, over a period of eight
and a half years, arranged 3,500 bookings and hosted 10,500 guests in those
units for periods as short as seven days.36 In 2014, the owners corporation
sought an order that the owner stop using the units in violation of the shortterm rental prohibition. However, the Supreme Court of Victoria denied the
order, ruling instead that the owners corporation had exceeded its jurisdiction
in attempting to prohibit short-term rentals. At the heart of the decision was
the court’s view that such a substantial interference ‘with lot owners’
proprietary rights’ required ‘clear and unambiguous language’ in the
empowering legislation.37 The power of the group of owners to diminish their
individual rights as owners by restricting the power to lease their units was so
significant an infringement of the rights of ownership that it could only occur
under specific and explicit statutory direction.38
The strong protection in the state of Victoria for individual property
rights within condominium, and for the right to lease units in particular, places
the jurisdiction at one end of a spectrum in the balance between protecting
the rights of individual owners and empowering the group of owners to place
limits on those rights. Somewhere in the middle of that spectrum is the
Canadian province of Ontario. In 1974, the Ontario Superior Court ruled that
the province’s condominium legislation did not permit a condominium
corporation to prohibit the rental of individual units.39 In doing so, the court
drew on an ancient English statute to confirm the right of owners to alienate
their property:
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One of the fundamental incidents of ownership is the right to alienate
the property that one owns. With respect to real property the right to
freely alienate dates to 1290, when the Imperial Statute of Quia
Emptores, 18 Edw. I, was enacted.40
The right of a condominium corporation to curtail such a long-standing and
well-established incident of ownership required ‘clear, unambiguous
language' that, the court ruled, was not present in Ontario’s condominium
legislation.41 However, just over four decades later, in 2016, the same year as
the decision of the Victoria Supreme Court involving the Watergate
Apartments, the Ontario Superior Court confirmed the power of
condominium corporations to prohibit short-term rentals.42 In doing so, the
court ruled that the prohibition on rentals for periods of fewer than four
months was ‘not so overly restrictive as to completely negate or
fundamentally alter the right of owners to lease their units’.43
At the other end of the spectrum is the Canadian province of British
Columbia. When uncertainty arose in the courts in the 1980s over whether
the province’s condominium legislation enabled owners to prohibit rentals,
the government re-wrote the statutory provision to confirm that strata
corporations could restrict and even prohibit rentals.44 This capacity extends
to short-term accommodation, and in order that strata corporations might
create effective sanctions to dissuade owners from short-term rentals, the
province recently increased the maximum fine that a strata corporation might
levy for a violation of a short-term rental bylaw from $200 once every seven
days, which was viewed by some as a small cost of doing business, to $1000
for every day that an infraction continues. 45 Some municipalities in British
Columbia have introduced bylaws that permit short-term rentals of principal
residences only, 46 but owners within condominium may go further,
prohibiting rentals entirely.
Property within condominium is embedded within a political
community of owners with the capacity to make and enforce rules over the
use of property. This political community is private in the sense that the right
to participate flows from ownership; it is democratic in that owners have
votes to elect a governing council or board and to set the rules.47 The rules of
these private, democratically governed communities can be invasive, and, in
some jurisdictions, may extend the rules set out in the bylaws of public
governments at the local or municipal level. In those jurisdictions that permit
rental restrictions or even prohibitions, the political embedding of property
within a community of owners empowers that community to curtail what has
long been understood as a fundamental incident of ownership of land: the
right to alienate.
Temporally Embedded
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In common law jurisdictions, the doctrine of estates constructs time as the
measure for possessory interests in land. In place of ‘the holistic ideas of
dominion’ or ‘any overarching notion of ownership’ that exist in civil law
traditions, 48 the common law, note Kevin and Susan Gray, employs the
doctrine of estates to fashion the object of ownership as ‘a slice of time in the
land’.49 Within this temporal framework, the freehold estate known as the fee
simple is the largest estate because it has the potential to last forever, an idea
expressed in the often-cited and elegant passage from the early modern
English courts:
[T]he land itself is one thing, and the estate in land is another thing,
for an estate in the land is a time in the land, or land for a time, and
there are diversities of estates, which are no more than diversities of
time, for he who has a fee-simple in land has a time in the land
without end, or the land for a time without end.50
The potential of a fee simple estate to last forever will not be realized
if its current holder dies without heirs. In this circumstance, the doctrine of
tenure—that all land is held of the Crown—operates to return the estate to
the Crown through the ancient feudal incident of tenure known as escheat. In
addition, property may be taken, usually by a public entity, for a public
purpose, and with fair compensation, under laws, variously labelled, of
expropriation, compulsory acquisition, or eminent domain. In many
jurisdictions, the basic framework for the taking of property without consent
is set out in constitutional provisions, reflecting the importance placed on the
appropriate balance between private rights and public interests in land.
The private property interests that condominium constructs have the
potential to last forever.51 In common law jurisdictions, condominium creates
separate freehold or fee simple interests in individual units, and the statutory
condominium regimes declare these freehold interests to have the same
character and quality as freehold interests outside condominium.52 Similarly,
the condominium form itself has the potential to last forever; as with business
corporations, there is no natural or pre-determined end date for a
condominium development and the corporation that serves as the governing
entity. But just as business corporations may be wound-up, so too a
condominium development may be dissolved. This involves the cancelation of
the plan or other constituting document, and, most importantly, the
termination of the private property interests that it created. Those interests
depend on the larger form for their existence. The legal architecture of
condominium creates them; without that structure, they cease to exist. In this
sense, condominium embeds the property interests that it creates within its
temporal frame. This temporal embedding means that the decision to dissolve
a condominium development is also a decision to terminate the private
property within.
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Dissolution and collective sale
Should we sell the building? At some point in the lifecycle of a condominium
development, unit owners will confront the question of whether they, as a
group, should proceed with a collective sale.53 Indeed, unit owners in many
condominium developments have reached this point already, a not
unsurprising development given that condominium statutes are now more
than 50 years old in most jurisdictions and an increasing number of
developments that deployed the legal form require extensive and expensive
renovations of the common property, including roofs, heating and cooling
systems, elevators, exterior windows and siding, and more. Moreover,
condominium developments exist within neighbourhoods, cities, and
metropolitan regions that change, as do the zoning rules, turning parcels of
land into enticing targets for redevelopment. A land developer’s offer that
includes a significant premium on individual unit values if the units are sold
collectively is a common tipping point that prompts a collective sale.
The dissolution of condominium involves cancelling the constituting
plan, winding up the condominium corporation, and terminating the private
interests in individual units. In what is usually a transitory step to facilitate a
collective sale, the former unit owners within condominium become coowners of all the property, including that which they had owned individually.
The decision to dissolve condominium, and thus to terminate individual
interests in land, is probably the single most important decision in the lifecycle
of a condominium development. For this reason, the process by which this
decision is reached, and the required threshold of consent among owners, is
crucial, not only for understanding the rights of individual property owners,
but also for determining the character of ownership within condominium.
Statutory condominium regimes around the world have generally adopted
either a presumption that the dissolution of condominium requires
unanimous consent (with an option to seek a court order to dissolve
condominium if unanimity is not possible) or a presumption that dissolution
may proceed with the consent of a supermajority of owners, usually 75 or 80
percent (with varying degrees of protection for the dissenting minority).54
In the last 20 years, there has been a significant shift among statutory
condominium jurisdictions away from a presumption that owners could insist
on their consent, to a presumption that the consent of a supermajority of
owners is sufficient. Hong Kong introduced a 90 percent dissolution threshold
in 1998, 55 and Singapore followed a year later, introducing supermajority
thresholds of 80 and 90 percent, depending on the age of the building.56 In
the US, Florida adopted an 80 percent threshold in 2007,57 and the following
year the Uniform Law Commission recommended, through its Uniform
Common Interest Ownership Act, that states adopt an 80 percent threshold,
although it also suggested that residential common interest communities
11

should have the option to raise that threshold.58 New Zealand adopted a 75
percent threshold in 2010, 59 and Hong Kong amended its legislation,
introducing a tiered regime that lowered the threshold for some buildings to
80 percent. 60 Among Australian states, in 2014 the Northern Territory
introduced a sliding threshold of 80 to 95 percent, depending on the age of
the development;61 New South Wales implemented a 75 percent threshold in
2017;62 and Queensland is considering a similar proposal. 63 In the Canadian
context, British Columbia introduced an 80 percent threshold in 2016.64
The title of the Hong Kong’s legislation—Land (Compulsory Sale for
Redevelopment) Ordinance—is revealing for its labelling of the shift to a
supermajority threshold as a form of compulsory sale. As Nicole Gilewicz and
I have argued elsewhere, the move to non-consensual dissolution is a shift
that permits a form of private-to-private taking in which some owners may
terminate the property interests of their neighbours.65 The dissenting owners
will be compensated for the loss of their interest, and the level of
compensation for each owner in a collective sale will commonly exceed the
sum that each owner would receive were they to sell their units individually,
but nonetheless, their interests will be terminated involuntarily. Hazel
Easthope describes this change to supermajority consent in order to dissolve
condominium as challenging ‘deep-seated ideals around the nature of home
ownership, and particularly the assumption that ownership is associated with
stability and control over what happens to one’s property.’66 Neighbours are
empowered to take the property of neighbours, usually to maximize the
exchange value of land for all owners, including those opposed to the sale,
but at the cost of the loss of security, which has commonly accompanied, and
been an important feature of, the ownership of land.
Condominium produces private interests in land that have the
potential to last forever, but that will not survive the dissolution of the legal
form that creates them. This temporal embedding of property within
condominium places the longevity of property interests in the hands of the
community of owners. As a result, the shift in many jurisdictions from a
presumption that the dissolution of condominium requires the unanimous
consent of owners to a presumption that a supermajority vote among owners
is sufficient is not simply a technical change; it remakes the meaning of
ownership. 67 The effect is to enhance the exchange value of property, by
facilitating its redevelopment, but to undermine the security that comes with
the right of an owner to insist that their property can be transferred only with
their consent.
Conclusion: embedding and disembedding property
In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi dangled an enticing metaphor in
suggesting that the nineteenth century push among northern European states
to construct self-regulating markets, animated by the principle of individual
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gain and governed only by the price mechanism, served to disembed markets
from society.68 This disembedding of markets from social and legal constraints
had contributed to the creation of great wealth, he continued, and was
integral to a system that had, for a time, produced unprecedented peace and
political stability in Europe, but Polanyi argued that it also caused horrendous
working and living conditions and the devastation of natural environments.
The consequences when the system collapsed in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, argued Polanyi, were two world wars, the great
depression, and the rise of fascism and communism.
Although I employ the metaphor differently, Polanyi’s embeddedness
provided the spark for thinking about condominium as embedded property.69
Condominium constructs a form of ownership that embeds property in a
community of owners. In this chapter I have outlined the spatial, political, and
temporal modes of that embedding. Moreover, the effect of that embedding
has been to precipitate a series of fundamental changes in the character of
land ownership. Ownership within condominium may now require a minimum
standard of personal behaviour to retain the status of owner (following the
use of eviction and sale orders for anti-social behaviour), it may no longer
have incidents that have been long associated with property (because of
restrictions imposed by the community of owners on the right to alienate),
and it may be terminated by neighbours without consent (where dissolution
proceeds on the basis of a supermajority vote). The embedding of property is
changing the character of ownership. Moreover, given the rapid rise of
condominium as a prominent, and, if existing trends continue, soon-to-be
dominant form of property within cities, then it will come more generally to
define the nature of property in land. Condominium will be the paradigm for
ownership of land, not simply a particular form among many.
However, the paradox of condominium property, to borrow from
Joseph Singer, 70 is that the embedding of property imbues condominium
owners with the collective capacity to disembed themselves from a larger
public realm. Indeed, condominium shares with other forms of common
interest community the capacity, perhaps even the propensity, to turn owner
attention inwards, to the concerns and interests of the community of owners
that these property regimes create. To some extent, this turning inwards is
inevitable and necessary; the owners, as co-owners of the common property,
have an interest in, and are responsible for, maintaining the common
property on which their private property depends. But one consequence is to
precipitate a disembedding of that community, and the owners within it, from
the larger public realm.
There is a considerable literature, most of it drawing on studies of
suburban homeowners associations in the US, that describes the capacity of
private residential governments to enable groups of owners to secede and, by
doing so, to exacerbate socio-economic and racial divisions.71 Geographers
who focus on condominium have turned their attention to this scholarship,
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including Gilad Rosen and Alan Walks who argue that condominium is the
principal mechanism fuelling the ‘expansion of privatopia to North America’s
urban centres’.72 Sociologist Randy Lippert has done so as well, although to
argue that condominium is more usefully understood as a site of myriad
governing regimes than as another level of government which might secede.73
Legal scholars engaged with condominium should also be asking whether
condominium, as an architecture of ownership that embeds property within
a community of owners, facilitates a problematic disembedding of property
and its owners from the larger social and political context, perhaps
contributing to the placelessness that Nicole Graham has argued confounds
contemporary property law.74 If the embedding of property is changing the
character of ownership, as I have argued here, then it is also important to ask
how the potential to disembed a community of property owners might also
change the character of ownership and what the effects of those changes
might be. To begin to answer these questions requires an understanding of
the institution of property as arising in the tension between individual and
community, and of how it is being reshaped by its location within
condominium.

A revised version of this piece appears as a chapter in Randy K Lippert and Stefan Treffers,
eds, Condominium Governance and Law in Global Urban Context (New York: Routledge, 2021)
29-44.

Notes
1

I thank Sarah Blandy, Chad Bush, Hazel Easthope, Alex Flynn, Anna Lund, Cathy Sherry, and
the editors of this volume, Randy Lippert and Stefan Treffers, for their comments on earlier
drafts of this chapter. This chapter also benefited from the comments of participants at the
International Research Forum on Multi-Owned Properties, Stellenbosch University, South
Africa, 17 January 2019, Nicole Johnston, convenor.
2
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 2 (A Facsimile of the 1st
Edition of 1765-1769, University of Chicago Press 1979) 2.
3
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(Cambridge University Press, 1990).
4
CB MacPherson, ‘The Meaning of Property’ in CB MacPherson (ed), Property: Mainstream
and Critical Positions (University of Toronto Press 1979) 4-6.
5
For a discussion of the complexity of individual and community interests in land within
Blackstone’s Commentaries (n 2), see David Schor, ‘How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian’
(2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 103.
6
See Michael Heller, ‘Common Interest Developments at the Crossroads of Legal Theory’
(2005) 37 Urban Lawyer 329.
7
CG van der Merwe, ‘The Adaption of the Institution of Apartment Ownership to Civilian
Property Law Structures in the Mixed Jurisdictions of South Africa, Sri Lanka and Louisiana’
(2008) 19 Stellenbosch Law Review 298, 303. By contrast, van der Merwe describes a unitary
approach to ownership in multi-unit developments as that where unit owners hold a coownership interest in the development (sometimes in the form of shares in an association, as
in a co-operative), with an ‘ancillary incident’, such as a lease, that entitles possession of a

14

particular unit. See the graphic illustrations of the two approaches in Hazel Easthope, The
Politics and Practices of Apartment Living (Edward Elgar 2019) 4-5.
8
In British Columbia, the default is one vote per strata lot, but some variation is permitted
for non-residential strata lots: Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, ss 53, 247, 248.
9
Carol Rose, ‘The Law is Nine-Tenths of Possession: An Adage Turned on Its Head’ in Yun
Chien-Chang (ed), Law and Economics of Possession (Cambridge University Press 2015) 53.
10
Joseph William Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (Yale University Press 2000)
31.
11
Cathy Sherry, ‘Lessons in Personal Freedom and Functional Land Markets: What Strata and
Community Title Can Learn from Traditional Doctrines of Property’ (2013) 36 UNSW Law
Journal 280, 314.
12
“black acre, n.” OED Online, Oxford University Press, June 2020,
www.oed.com/view/Entry/19672.
13
Thomas Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’ (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730,
740: “To illustrate, consider resources in land—the proverbial Blackacre. Let us start with the
understanding that A has the right to exclude others from Blackacre.”
14
Amnon Lehavi, The Construction of Property: Norms, Institutions, Challenges (Cambridge
University Press 2013) 3.
15
See Hanoch Dagan and Michael A Heller, ‘The Liberal Commons’ (2000) 110 Yale Law
Journal 549; Amnon Lehavi, ‘Mixing Property’ (2008) 38 Seton Hall Law Review 137; Gregory
Alexander, ‘Governance Property’ (2011) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1853.
16
Bare land or vacant land condominium is possible in some jurisdictions, allowing for what
is described as the horizontal subdivision of land, usually to create lots for single-family
structures, but is much less common than building condominium. For example, see Strata
Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 1 (definition of ‘bare land strata plan’).
17
Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corp No 747 v Korolekh, 2010 ONSC 4448.
18
ibid [2].
19
On the sources of the power to make such an order, and a comparative review across
statutory condominium jurisdictions, see Douglas C Harris, ‘Anti-Social Behaviour, Expulsion
from Condominium, and the Reconstruction of Ownership’ (2016) 54 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 53, 60-63. See Merwe, this volume, Neilson and Edlund, this volume, on responses in
South Africa and Europe.
20
The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, 2013 BCCA 484.
21
ibid.
22
The courts have generally used ‘misconduct’ to describe the behaviour rather than ‘antisocial behaviour’. I follow a literature, most of it relating to disorderly conduct in rental
housing, in using ‘anti-social behaviour’. See the discussion in Harris, ‘Anti-Social Behaviour’
(n 19) 59-60.
23
The Owners, Strata Plan NW 1245 v Linden, 2017 BCSC 852; Peel Standard Condominium
Corporation No. 984 v. 8645361 Canada Limited, 2018 ONSC 4339.
24
Linden (n 23) [37], [41].
25
Protecting Condominium Owners Act, 2015, SO 2015, c 28, Schedule 1.
26
ibid s 118 [not yet in force].
27
ibid.
28
The cases from Ontario and British Columbia suggest that it is owners with particular forms
of mental disorder whose ownership has become more precarious. See Harris, ‘Anti-Social
Behaviour’ (n 19) 83-85.
29
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett (ed), (Cambridge University Press
1988), Second Treatise.
30
Richard Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration, and the Rule of
Law (Harvard University Press 2011) 99, cited in Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the
Measure of Property (Cambridge University Press 2012) 25.

15

31

Carol Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of
Ownership (Westview Press 1994).
32
Waldron (n 30) 32.
33
Joseph William Singer, ‘Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society’
(2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 1009, 1010.
34
See Randy K Lippert, Condo Conquest: Urban Governance, Law, and Condoization in New
York City and Toronto (UBC Press 2019) on the growing complexity, power, and ubiquity of
condominium government. See Lisa Wei Gao, ‘Homeowner Associations’ Role in China’s
Condominium Governance’, this volume.
35
Owners Corporation PS 50139P v Balcombe [2016] VSC 384, [13].
36
ibid [18].
37
ibid [1].
38
Since the decision, the state of Victoria amended its legislation to facilitate the capacity of
owners corporations to regulate short-term rentals by increasing permissible fines against
owners if guests cause unreasonable noise, create security risks, or inflict damage to
property, but it did not extend the power to prohibit short-term rentals. See Owners
Corporation Amendment (Short-Stay Accommodation) Act 2018 (Vic).
39
Re Peel Condominium Corporation No 11 and Caroe et al, (1974) 4 OR (2d) 543.
40
ibid.
41
See the discussion of this case in Randy K Lippert, ‘Governing Condominium and Renters
with Legal Knowledge Flows and External Institutions’ (2012) 34 Law and Policy 263, 273-278.
42
Ottawa-Carleton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 961 v Menzies, 2016 ONSC 7699.
43
Ibid [54]. A similar balance has been constructed in Western Australia following the decision
of the Court of Appeal in Byrne v The Owners Ceresa River Apartments Strata Plan 55597
[2017] WASCA 104 to uphold the strata company’s bylaw prohibiting short-term rentals.
44
Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 141(2).
45
Strata Property Regulation, BC Reg 162/2018, s 7.1.
46
City of Vancouver, by-law No 12078, By-law to amend Zoning and Development By-law No
3575, Regarding Short Term Rental Accommodation (18 April 2018).
47
See Douglas C Harris, ‘Condominium Government and the Right to Live in the City’ (2019)
34 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 371.
48
Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th edn, Oxford University Press
2009) 56 (emphasis in original).
49
ibid 58 (emphasis in original).
50
Walsingham’s Case (1573) 2 Plowd 547, 555; 75 ER 805, 816-17.
51
Some jurisdictions permit the limited use of long-term leasehold interests within
condominium. In British Columbia, leasehold strata property is limited primarily to public
bodies, including municipalities, universities, and First Nations. See Strata Property Act, SBC
1998, c 43, ss 199-203; Strata Property Regulations, BC Reg 43/2000, s 12.1.
52
For example, see the Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 239(2).
53
See Easthope and Randolph, this volume.
54
Douglas C Harris and Nicole Gilewicz, ‘Dissolving Condominium, Private Takings, and the
Nature of Property’ in B Hoops et al (eds), Rethinking Expropriation Law II: Context, Criteria,
and Consequences of Expropriation (Eleven International Publishing 2015) 266.
55
Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance (Cap 545, Laws of Hong Kong), s 3.
56
Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act 1999 (no. 21 of 1999), Part VA. See Kah Leng Ter, ‘A
Man’s Home is [Not] His Castle—En Bloc Collective Sales in Singapore’ (2008) 20 Singapore
Academy of Law Journal 49; Kang Sood Teo, ‘Collective Sales in Singapore’ (2010) 22
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 66.
57
Fla Stat Condominium Act § 718.117 (2007).
58
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act (Uniform Law Commission 2008), § 2-118 (a).
59
Unit Titles Act 2010 (NZ), ss 98 and 187.

16

60

Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) (Specification of Lower Percentage Notice) (Cap
545A, Laws of Hong Kong), ss 3-4.
61
Termination of Unit Plans and Unit Title Schemes Act 2014 (NT) ss 4 (definition of ‘required
percentage’), 10-11.
62
Strata Schemes Development Act 2015 (NSW) pt 10, s 154 (definition of ‘required level of
support’). See also Laurence Troy, Hazel Easthope, Bill Randolph, and Simon Pinnegar, '“It
depends what you mean by the term rights”: strata termination and housing rights’ (2017) 32
Housing Studies 1.
63
Commercial and Property Law Research Centre, Body Corporate Governance Issues: Bylaws, Debt Recovery and Scheme Termination (Queensland Government Property Law Review
Options Paper Recommendations 2017) 73-75.
64
Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, ss 272, 277. See Douglas C Harris, ‘Owning and
Dissolving Strata Property’ (2017) 50 UBC Law Review 935.
65
Harris and Gilewicz, ‘Dissolving Condominium’ (n 54).
66
Easthope (n 7) 146.
67
See the debate between Lee Anne Fennell, ‘Fee Simple Obsolete’ (2016) 91 New York
University Law Review 1457, and Katrina M Wyman, ‘In Defence of the Fee Simple’ (2017) 93
Notre Dame Law Review 1, for an analysis of what might gained and lost in expanding the
scope of private-to-private takings.
68
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time
(Beacon Press 1944/2001).
69
The literature on ‘embeddedness' is vast, but see Fred Bloc, ‘Introduction’ in Polanyi 2001
(n 68) xviii, xxiii.
70
Singer, Entitlement (n 10).
71
See the early and important work of Evan McKenzie, Privatopia: Homeowner Associations
and the Rise of Residential Private Government (Yale University Press 1994); Edward J Blakely
and Mary Gail Snyder, Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States (Brookings
Institution Press 1997).
72
Gilad Rosen and Alan Walks, ‘Beyond Gating: Condo-ism as a Way of Urban Life’, in S
Bagaeen and O Uduku (eds), Beyond Gated Communities (Routledge 2015) 156.
73
Lippert, Condo Conquest (n 34) 223-226.
74
Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, Environment, Law (Routledge 2011) 5-8.

17

